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INTRODUCTION
Bennett v. Bennett' was a diversity action brought in the federal court for the
District of Columbia to enforce a custody determination of a District of Columbia
court. It involved two different causes of action based on the plaintiff father's
asserted right to custody of abducted children who had been taken to Ohio by their
mother. The first was a tort action for money damages for harboring a child contrary
to the right of the lawful custodian and the second was for an injunction directing and
enjoining the defendant from interfering with the custody rights of the plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals considered the domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction and concluded that it would not preclude the tort cause of action, but
would preclude federal jurisdiction to entertain the injunction request. 2 Judge
Edwards dissented3 from the decision of his two colleagues on the Fourth Circuit,
arguing that enforcement of a child custody decree by injunction was different from
and did not allow for modification of the decree. Therefore, he asserted, the federal
court should entertain a diversity action for enforcing by injunction a state custody
decree. This Article offers an analysis in support of Judge Edwards' conclusion.
Interstate abduction of a child from the rightful custody of one parent, either by
or on behalf of the other parent, has been widely recognized as a major social and
legal problem.4 More significant than the deliberate flaunting of the law is the now
* Manley 0. Hudson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 1043.
3. Id. at 1044.
4. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Prefatory Note (1968) [hereinafter cited as UCCJA]. The UCCJA text
and notes can be found at 9 U.L.A. 111-70 (1979); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979, S.105: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subconm. on Child and Human
Development of the Comm. ott Labor and Human Resources. 96th Cong., 2d Seass. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Hearing]; S. KArZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN (1981); Bodenheimer,
Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees. Joint Custody,
and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 978 (1977); Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in
Custody Litigation: Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 495 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Bodenheimer, Rights of Children]; Bodenheimer, Judicial and Legislative Cures for Child Custody Ills. 12 JuDGES' J. 82
(1973); Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 3 FAM. L.Q. 304 (1969); Bodenheimer, The Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Lals, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1207 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy]; Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform
Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1965); Fain, Custody of the Children, I
CALIF. FAm. LAw. 545, 545-47 (C.E.B. 1961); Katz, Legal Remedies for Child Snatching, 15 FAM. L.Q. 103 (1981);
Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed
Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 183 (1965); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795, 798
(1964); Comment, Cotflicting Custody Decrees: In Whose Best Interest?. 7 DUQ. L. REV. 262. 266 (1969); Comment,
Children in Transit: Child Custody and the Cotiflict of La's, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 160, 161-62 (1973); Comment, The
Puzzle of Jurisdiction in Child Custody Actions. 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1966); Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith
and Credit to Child Custody Decrees?. 73 YALE L.J. 134, 139 (1963); Note, The Search for a Solution to Child
Snatching, I I HOFSTRA L. REV. 1073 (1983).
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accepted fact that the abducted child is likely to suffer from the trauma of the
abduction and separation from the custodian. 5 In the past the opposite belief, that
children were so resilient as not to be affected by the instability of caretakers,
paralleled the United States Supreme Court's holding under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution that any state with jurisdiction could modify a previous
child custody order to the same extent as the court granting it.6 Without a federal
requirement to defer to the granting state's authority, interstate abduction of children
has been encouraged. The parent who had been unsuccessful in the granting state
simply took the child elsewhere in search of a more favorable decree.
To appreciate this phenomenon, a review of the effect of a child custody order
within the granting jurisdiction itself may be helpful. Within the state of the granting
court, enforcement of a custody decree against the noncustodial parent who is retain-
ing possession of the child in violation of the decree can be accomplished by: a
contempt order for violation of the custody decree, in which case the offender could
be fined or imprisoned until the child is produced; habeas corpus to produce the child;
or, an injunction to produce the child or to cease interfering with the rights of the
custodian. 7 A child custody order is always modifiable, however, if circumstances
have changed sufficiently. 8 Thus, a parent in violation of a custody order may move
for modification in the enforcement proceeding. Because efficiency usually calls for
entertaining any modification request rather than proceeding on the enforcement
action, state courts traditionally have allowed a motion to modify; as a consequence,
a practice developed of converting enforcement attempts into proceedings on the
merits when modification was requested. 9 A parent would have little chance to
succeed in this proceeding, however, if he or she was in violation of an order of a
court before which he or she already had appeared and had only the abduction of the
child to present as changed circumstances. In these situations, a parent often would
take the child to another state.
Courts of the child's location are notoriously reputed to favor the local parent
both in interpreting the law and in fact-finding. 0 Because full faith and credit did not
require enforcement of a modifiable foreign custody order, the courts of a state to
which a child had been taken had even less reason to ignore a request for a hearing on
the merits than did the courts in the state of original jurisdiction. Courts of a second
state routinely would entertain either the abductor's new proceeding or a motion in a
5. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982); State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, 97
N.M. 327, 330, 639 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1981).
6. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 4, at 1210.
7. P. HoFF & J. SCHULMAN, INTERSTATE CHILD-CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRAC-
TICE AND LAW 8-10 to -18 (1982); Budlong v. Budlong, 51 R.I. 113, 115, 152 A. 256, 257 (1930) (injunction). Cf.
Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d 814 (1978) (contempt or habeas corpus).
8. See e.g., Bodenheimer, Rights of Children, supra note 4, at 498.
9. Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Iowa 1976). However, nothing has prevented states
from enforcing custody orders by contempt, habeas corpus or injunction until such time as the modification issues have
been presented and heard separately on a motion to modify. Barcus v. Bareus, 278 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Iowa 1979). See
also Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d 814 (1978).
10. Leslie L. F. v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d 86, 93 n.4, 441 N.Y.S. 2d 911,916 n.4 (Fam. Ct. 1981); UCCJA,
supra note 4, Prefatory Note.
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proceeding for enforcement of a child custody order. " Although this would be a new
decree in the second jurisdiction, in common parlance it is referred to as a modifica-
tion.
The tendency to favor a local party increased the probability of a parent's
obtaining custody if he or she went to a new jurisdiction rather than trying again for
custody in the court that already had ruled in the opposite direction. This psycholog-
ical advantage, plus the combination of the court's freedom under full faith and credit
to modify and the common practice of modifying in enforcement actions, rendered
abduction an attractive possibility. Recent changes in state and federal legislation
have decreased the advantages of interstate abduction and have increased the oppor-
tunities for effective remedies against the abductor. However, Bennett v. Bennett12
and its offspring, Lloyd v. Loeffler, 13 threaten the most promising federal effort to
reduce parental kidnapping between states.
I. STATE LEGISLATION: UCCJA
Legislative attacks upon the interstate child abduction problem have centered
both on reducing the number of states that could have jurisdiction initially to grant a
decree of child custody and on strengthening the interstate authority of the initial
decree.
A. Initial Jurisdiction
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) attempts to limit the
number of states that have the power to make initial child custody orders. A state that
enacts the UCCJA limits the power of its courts by specifying only four bases for
subject matter jurisdiction,' 4 none of which are the presence of the child alone. The
basis most often used is the "home state" of the child, the state where the child has
resided for six months. 15 That state also will have initial jurisdiction for six months
after the child has left the state. The other three alternative bases for jurisdiction allow
for concurrent jurisdiction to enter an initial custody order in more than one state.
One basis is "significant connection," which requires that the state have a significant
connection with the child and one contestant, and that there be substantial evidence
concerning the child's care in that state.' 6 For example, a child may be taken to a new
state that will have "home state" jurisdiction after six months, but the original state
may continue to have jurisdiction as well because the child had lived there for many
years, developing significant social and educational contacts and building an array of
evidence pertinent to his or her care. The third basis for initial jurisdiction under the
UCCJA is abandonment or "emergency," which is worded broadly to include the
11. UCCJA, supra note 4, Prefatory Note. A major exception developed in some states when the party seeking
modification had "unclean hands." See, e.g., Kennedy v. Carman, 471 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1971).
12, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
13, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
14. UCCJA, supra note 4, § 3.
15, Id. § 3(a)(1).
16, The actual wording of this section uses a "best interest of the child" basis. However, the "best interest" can be
found only because of "significant connection" and "substantial evidence."
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subjection of a child to mistreatment, abuse or neglect within the state.' 7 The last
basis for initial jurisdiction is the absence of jurisdiction elsewhere. 18
The requirement that something more than mere presence of the child be found
for initial jurisdiction should discourage pre-decree interstate abduction of children.
The UCCJA, however, permits concurrent jurisdiction in more than one state to enter
an initial decree and allows for wide variation in interpretation to determine which
states have jurisdiction. Although residence in a state for six months is an obvious
basis for jurisdiction, the vaguely worded alternative bases of "significant connec-
tion" and "emergency" allow for jurisdiction in two or more states under circum-
stances that can vary widely because of differing interpretations of these bases. Thus,
a significant incentive for initially taking a child to another jurisdiction remains.
B. Modification and Enforcement Power
A major goal of the UCCJA is to decrease the opportunity for modification of a
child custody decree in a new jurisdiction, and thereby discourage interstate child
abduction.
1. UCCJA Provisions
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act prohibits a court from modifying
the custody orders of other states except in certain specified instances, and it requires
summary enforcement of these child custody orders when they meet the standards of
the Act. Volumes of early writing concerning interstate custody and the proposed
UCCJA, especially by Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer,' 9 draw the distinction be-
tween modification and enforcement. A modification hearing involves the entire
range of evidence pertinent to the substantive issue of the child's best welfare and
concludes with a judgment on the merits of that issue based on the forum state's
internal standards for determining a child's welfare. An enforcement proceeding
determines only whether the court granting the initial order had jurisdiction to do so
and whether it retains that jurisdiction and, if so, it concludes with an appropriate
order to enforce the initial decree. The UCCJA is designed to require enforcement
rather than modification by the court in the second forum. The Act's drafters stated
that the power to enforce does not include the power to modify. 20 Some courts have
stated succinctly that in a recognition and enforcement action under the UCCJA the
circumstances of the child are not in issue.
2 1
Section 14 of the UCCJA provides that once "a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this State shall not modify that decree." 22 The goal is to
force resolution of modification issues in the court that granted the initial order. This
section prevents the second jurisdiction from modifying the initial order, so long as
17. UCCJA, supra note 4, § 3(a)(3).
18. Id. § 3(a)(4).
19. See supra note 4.
20. UCCJA, supra note 4, § 15 commissioners' note.
21. Wyatt v. Falhsing, 396 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Ala. App. 1981).
22. UCCJA, supra note 4. § 14.
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any other basis for initial jurisdiction that is substantially in accord with the second
state's jurisdictional law (usually the UCCJA's four alternative bases) continues to
exist in the court of the initial order. This limit applies even though the subsequent
state had become the "home state" by virtue of the child moving there and remaining
there for six months.
After a second state has become the "home state," the most likely basis for
jurisdiction to continue in the initial state would be "significant connection." Pro-
fessor Bodenheimer believed that the initial child custody decree constituted both the
significant connection and the substantial evidence necessary under the "significant
connection" basis for jurisdiction.2 3 She evidently believed that this would be true
indefinitely, so that the only manner in which the initial court would lose the exclu-
sive power to modify would be through relinquishment of the power or the absence of
all the parties from that state. This has been described as the most strict view of
exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify.2 4 A less strict approach would consider
whether the lapse of time was so great that neither the preexisting decree nor any
other prior relationship with the child was sufficient to find a significant connection
with the initial state. The purpose of Section 14 of the UCCJA, whether interpreted
strictly or not, is to insure that once a custody decree had been granted, no concurrent
jurisdiction to modify would exist; thus, there would be no incentive to move to
another state hoping to obtain a new order-either immediately or after six months.
The connections between the state of the first decree and the child would have to
atrophy over a much longer period of time before any other jurisdiction could modify
the decree.
Section 15 of the UCCJA25 requires that the second state enforce the decree of
the initial state so long as the initial state continues to have jurisdiction. This section
permits filing a certified copy of a state's custody decree for use in any summary
enforcement procedure available in another state. The drafters' note states that the
authority to enforce the out-of-state decree does not include the power to modify, and
that "if modification is desired, the petition must be directed to the court which has
jurisdiction to modify under Section 14. ",26 The registered decree would take on a
local or domestic character solely for enforcement purposes and not for modification
purposes. How enforcement was carried out would depend on the particular enforce-
ment procedures of the second jurisdiction.27 Contempt, or a restricted form of
habeas corpus in which the merits may not be considered, may be available. 28 A
petition to enforce a foreign judgment,2 9 a petition for a warrant to deliver the child, 30
23. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 14 FAm.
L.Q. 203, 215 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody.]
24. P. Hor & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 3-30.
25. UCCJA, supra note 4, § 15.
26. UCCJA, supra note 4, § 15 commissioners' note.
27. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody. supra note 23, at 221.
28. Barcus v. Barcus, 278 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Iowa 1979); Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d 814
(1978).
29. Frumkes & Elser. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: The Florida Experience, 53 FLA. B.J. 684, 687
(1979).
30. In re Marriage of Schwander, 79 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 145 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1978).
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or a form of injunction requested as a motion to enforce or to show cause why the
child should not be delivered may be suitable.
3 1
2. UCCJA Shortcomings
Although nearly all state legislatures have enacted a version of the UCCJA,
Professor Bodenheimer's last publication sadly bemoaned the fact that the Act was
not achieving the full expectations of its drafters.32 Other experts agreed.33 The
reasons are twofold: 34 first, differing versions of the Act have been enacted, and
second, there is state-by-state variation in interpretation of the Act's requirements.
Both of these phenomena operate to allow for more findings of jurisdiction and less
deference to initial states' orders than the drafters envisaged.
Unfortunately, as described cogently by Bodenheimer, early interpretations evi-
denced a parochial concern with finding added jurisdiction in the second forum. 35
Courts of the second state quickly developed what she termed "myths." First, the
courts misused the requisites for determining initial jurisdiction by using them as a
basis for modification jurisdiction in a second state. For example, when a second
state became the "home state," it was assumed erroneously that modification power
existed. This permitted the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction to modify. Second, the
courts misused the six-month "home state" provision for initial jurisdiction by hold-
ing that as soon as it existed in a second state, the continuing jurisdiction of the initial
court had ended. This error was committed by the courts' failure to follow the
UCCJA direction to consider whether jurisdiction continued on any of the alternative
bases for jurisdiction under the second state's law. The effect was to allow modifica-
tion in a new state after only six months, no matter how significant the connection
and evidence in the initial state remained. Both myths exemplify the extreme ten-
dency of a local court to find that it has power to deal with a child before it. Both
ignored the command of Section 14 and, thus, continued encouragement of child
abduction with the lure of obtaining a new order in a new state.
A third myth in the making, which Bodenheimer feared based on conversations
with attorneys, was that a proceeding begun in the second state to enforce the initial
decree could be turned automatically into a modification proceeding. 36 The Bennett
court followed this myth. Converting an enforcement proceeding to one entertaining
issues on the merits, without the requisite modification jurisdiction under the
UCCJA, would subvert the Act's primary method of deterring interstate abduction of
children after a custody order had been granted. The effectiveness of the UCCJA
requires an understanding and acceptance of the fact that enforcement can be granted
by a second state, which can refer any request for modification back to the state that
initially granted the order.
31. P. Hopi & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 8-16.
32. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 23.
33. Joint Hearing, supra note 4.
34. P. HoFF & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 1-6; Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition,
and Enforcement, 66 MiNN. L. REv. 711, 808 [hereinafter cited as Coombs, Enforcementl.
35. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 23, at 213.
36. Id. at 220.
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C. Remaining Difficulties
Three major difficulties in interstate enforcement of custody decrees remained
even after most states had enacted the UCCJA. One difficulty was that no law was
aiding the custodian in finding the abducting parent, who could have gone anywhere
with the child. Of course, without locating the abductor, no enforcement is possible.
The second difficulty was the application of the UCCJA itself: the fact that the
UCCJA had not been uniformly adopted in all jurisdictions, its allowance of con-
current initial jurisdiction, and the unfortunate propensity of courts to misconstrue its
modification and enforcement provisions, so as to allow the exercise of "second-
state" jurisdiction to modify initial custody orders. Another difficulty was the neces-
sity for the custodian under the initial decree to go to the courts of the abductor's state
to attempt to regain the child by enforcement of the decree. Burdens of time, ex-
pense, representation by a new attorney, and the expected favoritism toward the local
party often were insurmountable. All of these difficulties together led to pressure for
federal intervention. 37 After a variety of different proposals, the Wallop Amendment,
titled the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 38 (PKPA), was passed by Congress in
December, 1980.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION: PKPA
Congress dealt with all three of the above difficulties in passing the PKPA. The
difficulty of locating the abductor was addressed by making the Parent Locator
Service available to custodians trying to locate their children. 39 Most of the Act was
directed to alleviating the shortcomings of the UCCJA. 40 It is the thesis of this Article
that, indirectly, Congress also dealt with the difficulty of enforcement in a foreign
jurisdiction. The reason is that the PKPA necessarily affects the determination of
federal diversity jurisdiction.
This federal law affecting child custody is narrow and is limited to allocation of
authority to determine child custody among the states. The PKPA places a federal
duty upon state courts to enforce and not modify a previous state court's custody
determination .41 At the same time the PKPA commands that the initial court's ju-
37. P. HoFF & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 1-6.
38. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3567 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C. § 663
(Supp. V 1981). 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982)).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 663 (Supp. V 1981).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), hereinafter referred to as the PKPA. In addition, § 10 of the PKPA made the
provisions of the Federal Fugitive Felon Act applicable to parental kidnapping and flight to avoid state felony prosecution.
18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982).
41. The specific words "shall enforce" and "shall not modify ... any child custody determination," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(a) (1982), have led to controversy, not relevant to this argument, concerning whether the act requires "full faith
and credit," or something less. See Coombs, Enforcement, supra note 34, at 729, 818-22, 834-48.
Controversy also exists concerning the extent to which the PKPA preempts state jurisdictional law concerning child
custody, but there is general agreement that preemption exists at least to the extent of any conflict between state law and
the PKPA. See id.
Coombs' Enforcement article is the definitive analysis of the PKPA to date. Coombs was Deputy Chief Counsel,
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Committees on the Judiciary, United States Senate, during the de-
velopmental stages of the PKPA in Congress. See Coombs, The "Snatched" Child is Halfivay Home in Congress, 11
FAM. L.Q. 407 (1978).
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risdiction to modify continues. It allocates continuing power to modify to the court
that initially made a child custody order, and it requires another state's court that
subsequently obtains jurisdiction to defer to that initial court for modification. 42 The
PKPA is effectively an amendment to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982), because it uses federal power to allocate authority by limiting the
freedom of a state to ignore the previous child custody determinations of another
state.43
The purpose of the PKPA is to achieve the same goals as the UCCJA by a
federal allocation among the states of the authority to determine custody issues. 44 In
other words, the PKPA functions primarily to end the myths developing in the
application of the UCCJA. Its proper implementation requires an appreciation of the
difference between enforcement and modification of a child custody decree.
A. Enforcement Requirement
The PKPA's main provision states that the "authorities of every State shall
enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify . . . any child custody de-
termination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another
State."'45 The mandate to enforce and not modify continues so long as the court of the
initial state continues to have jurisdiction.
Two features, unfortunately, complicate understanding of this basically simple
and narrow statute. First, the "provisions" appear to be jurisdictional requisites, but
they are not federally imposed requirements for obtaining initial jurisdiction; the
"provisions" are conditions or standards that must have existed at the time of the
initial decree in order for it to be entitled to the PKPA's right of later enforcement
without modification in another state.4 6 In other words, they are simply tests for
determining whether the jurisdictional basis for the initial decree entitles it to be
enforced and not modified.47 Jurisdiction to make an initial order continues to be
determined by the law of the state, usually the UCCJA.
The second complicating feature is that these provisions are somewhat similar,
but different in important respects, from the UCCJA's initial jurisdiction
requirements. 4 In contrast to the UCCJA's actual jurisdictional bases, the PKPA's
"provisions" do not recognize altemative conditions under which orders would be
equally entitled to enforcement; they make the "home state for six months" condition
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
43. In only two respects does it directly affect the power of a state to initially determine a child's custody. It requires
that notice be given and it forbids the exercise of jurisdiction during the pendency of another proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(e), (g) (1982); Coombs, Enforcement, supra note 34, at 765.
44. The PKPA lists among its purposes: to facilitate enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, to discourage
continuing interstate controversies over child custody, and to deter interstate abductions. Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94
Stat. 3569 (1980).
45. 28 U.S.C § 1738A(a) (1982).
46. Id. § 1738A(c). This section states, "A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with
the provisions of this section only if- (I) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and (2) one of the
following conditions is met: ...." "Conditions" or "provisions" follow describing five fact situations similar to those
that constitute jurisdictional bases under the UCCJA.
47. Coombs, Enforcement, supra note 34, at 821, 838, 849; P. HoFF & J. SCHULNIAN, supra note 7. at 3-34.
48. Coombs, Enforcement. supra note 34, at 820; P. HoFF & J. SCttULMAN supra note 7, at 3-34 to -36.
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primary. Thus, it is ordinarily only the home state court's decree that will be entitled
to recognition and enforcement under the PKPA. "Significant connection" as a basis
for initial jurisdiction would not entitle the decree to PKPA protection unless there
had not been another home state. 49 A decree depending on "emergency" jurisdiction
would be entitled to PKPA protection in the absence of abandonment, only if the
emergency were mistreatment or abuse of the child.5 ° Therefore, a few child custody
decrees that would be valid within a state because they meet the jurisdictional
requisites of that state's UCCJA, would not be entitled to interstate enforcement
under the PKPA.
These complications should not obscure the clear federal duty. A state custody
decree made with jurisdiction that is consistent with the PKPA "provisions" must be
enforced and not modified by courts of another state (unless the PKPA exception
discussed below applies). The second court is expected to use whatever summary
enforcement proceedings are available under its normal procedures. 5' The PKPA
does not create or specify enforcement remedies.
B. Continuing Jurisdiction
When a child is abducted and taken to another state, the law of that second state
may confer jurisdiction to make initial custody determinations. For example, under
the UCCJA the second state may become the home state after six months or there may
be "significant connection" to the child in the second state. In these situations locally
influenced interpretations of the UCCJA alone have allowed the second state to
entertain a proceeding on the merits and enter a modification decree. The PKPA
preempts state law that permits modification in the second state solely because ju-
risdiction to make an initial decree exists. 52 The PKPA requires enforcement of the
prior decree. Thus, the first myth under the UCCJA is destroyed.
The PKPA, in subsection (d), provides that the jurisdiction of the first court (the
jurisdictional requisites of which were consistent with the "provisions" of the PKPA
initially) continues if that state remains the residence of the child or of any of the
contestants, so long as the first court continues to have jurisdiction under its own law.
In nearly every state its own law of jurisdiction will be its version of the UCCJA with
its four alternative bases for jurisdiction. Home state or "significant connection" is
most likely to continue at the time that someone is attempting to obtain a decree in
another state. So long as the state in which the initial order was entered continues to
be the home state or to have a significant connection with the child under its own law,
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (1982).
50. Id. § 1738(c)(2)(C)(ii).
51. Hoff and Schulman urge attorneys to attempt a wide range of remedies including simply a motion to enforce.
The order would be the preventional equivalent of an injunction, e.g., Deliver the Child or Refrain from not Delivering.
P. HoiF & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 8-10 to -18. They also suggest requesting an order to show cause why the
custody order should not be enforced because this would shift the burden of proof to the abducting party. Id. at 8-16.
52. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122, 126 (Ala. App. 1982); Tufares v. Wright, 98 N.M. 8, 10, 644 P.2d 522,
524 (1982); Belosky v. Belosky, 97 N.M. 365, 366, 640 P.2d 471, 472 (1982); State ex rel Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M.
327, 332,639 P.2d 1181, 1186 (1981); Diane W. v. Norman W., 112 Misc. 2d 114, 116, 446 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (1982).
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it will continue to have jurisdiction under its own law. Therefore, it will continue to
have jurisdiction under subsection (d) of the PKPA. 53
The language of the PKPA is unambiguous. Creation of the initial jurisdictional
requisites in a second state does not end the continuing jurisdiction in the initial state.
Thus, the second myth under the UCCJA is also shattered. Application of this
section, however, may be the Achilles' heel of the PKPA.
54
C. Limited Power to Modify
The only exception to the duty to enforce and not modify is in subsection (f),
which dovetails with the continuing jurisdiction section. Subsection (f) states affirma-
tively that a court of a second state may modify a custody determination of the court
of another (initial or first) state if it has jurisdiction to make a child custody de-
termination and if the court of the first state "no longer has jurisdiction, or it has
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination." 55
The subsection contains an ambiguity in that it does not specify whether the
question of continuing jurisdiction is to be resolved on the basis of the PKPA's
"provisions" or on the jurisdictional law of the first or initial state. To be consistent
with the wording and intent of the preceding continuing jurisdiction section (subsec-
tion (d)), it must mean the jurisdictional law of the initial state. Those who developed
the language of the PKPA state that the PKPA was to reinforce the restriction on
modification first articulated in the UCCJA's section 14 that there be no power to
modify so long as the initial state retains jurisdiction according to its own law. 56
Decisions applying the PKPA either recognize that the lack of continuing jurisdiction
in subsection (f) is determined by the test of subsection (d)57 or they simply discontin-
ue their analysis of continuing jurisdiction after applying subsection (d).58 If the
initial state continues to have jurisdiction according to its own law, the only federal
basis for allowing a second state to modify is that the initial state has declined to
exercise jurisdiction. 59
D. Application
The PKPA is applied without any consideration of the merits of the underlying
child custody controversy. No substantive considerations can be entertained until its
standards for determining jurisdiction have been applied. Thus, it supplies a con-
53. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122, 126 (Ala. App. 1982); Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034. 1038
(Ala. App. 1982); Bullard v. Bullard, 3 Hawaii App. 194, 647 P.2d 294 (1982); Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899. 903
(Mont. 1982). An early New Mexico opinion stated that the first state must also continue to satisfy the "'jurisdictional"
requisites of the PKPA, State ex rel Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M. 327, 330. 639 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1981 ). but later decisions
apply the law of the initial state only to determine continuing jurisdiction. Sema v. Salazar, 98 N.M. 648, 650, 651 P.2d
1292, 1294 (1982); Olsen v. Olsen, 98 N.M. 644, 646, 651 P.2d 1288. 1290 (1982).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 63-67, for an explanation of a troublesome weakness.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982).
56. P. HOFw & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 3-40.
57. Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d 86, 89. 441 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
58. See cases cited supra note 53.
59. E. E. B. v. D. A., 89 N.J. 595,446 A.2d 871 (1982), cert. deniedsub nom. Angle v. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. 1203
(1983), reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 1806 (1983). See also Moore v. Perez. 428 So. 2d 113 (Ala. App. 1983). Cf. Leslie L.F.
v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d 86, 90. 441 N.Y.S.2d 911. 915 (Fain. Ct. 1981).
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gressionally recognized need: "national standards under which the courts . . . will
determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes." 6 When it has no jurisdiction to
modify, a court in a second state must act to enforce the decree. Thus, through
mandated enforcement, the PKPA achieves its stated purpose to "facilitate the
enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister States."
61
After a child custody order of a state has been entered and a court of another
state is asked to enforce or modify that order, whether the second court must enforce
or has the authority to modify under the PKPA can be determined through a four step
inquiry process.
Step 1: Determine whether the court of the second state has subject matter
jurisdiction according to its own jurisdictional law, its version of the UCCJA. If not,
the inquiry is complete and the request to modify should be dismissed because the
PKPA mandates enforcement of the initial decree according to its terms. The court of
the second state should grant summary enforcement. If there is jurisdiction, the
inquiry continues.
Step 2: Determine whether the initial order was granted consistently with the
"provisions" of the PKPA, which are jurisdictional conditions necessary to entitle a
party to a decree of enforcement and to preclude its modification. If the initial court
was a court of the home state, there was no home state and the court had "significant
connection" to the child, there was "emergency" jurisdiction, or no other state would
take jurisdiction, then the order of the initial court would be consistent with the
provisions of the PKPA and the inquiry should continue. If the initial court did not
have jurisdiction at the time it rendered the decree consistent with any of the "pro-
visions" as defined in the PKPA, then its order may be ignored and the merits of the
custody controversy heard.62
Step 3: Determine whether the court granting the initial decree has continuing
jurisdiction under subsection (d) of the PKPA. Such jurisdiction requires that one of
the parties or the child must still reside in the initial state and that state must have
jurisdiction according to its own law.
It is essential that every basis for jurisdiction in the initial state be examined at
this point. These ordinarily will be the four alternative bases of the UCCJA. The most
likely basis would be "home state," which continues for six months after removal of
the child, or "significant connection" as defined in the UCCJA. It is doubtful that
subsection (d) adopted the strict continuing jurisdiction doctrine that Professor
Bodenheimer had hoped would develop under the UCCJA. If her strict interpretation
that "significant connection" could be based on the former hearing and decree ap-
plied, continuing jurisdiction would nearly always be found.63 In contrast, under a
60. Pub. L. No. 96-611. § 7(b), 94 Stat. 3569 (1980).
61. Id. § 7(d)(3).
62. Dobyns v. Dobyns, 650 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Mo. App. 1983); Virginia E. E. v. Alberto S. P., 110 Misc. 2d 448,
440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1981); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295 (WVyo. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1436 (1983); cf.
Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. App. 1982).
63, Hoff and Schulman stated that the PKPA intended to adopt that interpretation. P. Hoi' & J. SCHULMAN, supra
note 7. at 3-31. In Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034, 1038 (Ala. App. 1982), a forum court held that it retained
continuing jurisdiction because of its having granted the initial decree and the contestant father remaining in the state two
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standard for "significant connection" that requires relatively recent contacts and fresh
evidence, a long passage of time would weaken the significance of even a former
hearing and decree. 6
4
The success of the PKPA in achieving its goal will depend on the application of
subsection (d). Although the law of the initial state is to determine its own continuing
jurisdiction, the court of the second state in which modification or enforcement is
being sought decides what the law of the initial state is. Thus, the propensity of local
courts to find power in themselves may lead the second state's court to misinterpret
the jurisdictional law of the initial court and to find that it no longer continues to have
jurisdiction. This is illustrated in a New York case in which the child had lived his
entire life in California, where the initial decree was granted in 1972, and had been in
the forum state of New York only one year, from 1978 to 1979. The court held that
California would not have jurisdiction "since no jurisdictional predicate exists under
the UCCJA as adopted by California." 65 The court described several California cases
in which courts had declined jurisdiction after the child had been out of the state from
two and one-half years to five years. It distinguished one case in which the California
court held that it retained continuing jurisdiction after only an eighteen month ab-
sence, on the ground that the second state had not passed the UCCJA. Remarkably,
and without contrasting the child's lifelong connection to California against the mere
one year in New York, it justified its decision that California no longer had jurisdic-
tion on the basis that the California decisions explicitly articulate that custody de-
terminations should be made "in the forum which possesses greatest access to the
relevant evidence." 66 This strongly suggests that the New York court assumed that
the state that has the most relevant evidence is the home state. The California de-
cisions do not support that conclusion, but rather indicate that a longer time period
away from California is more compelling. 67 Thus, the second myth under the UCCJA
may be sprouting under the PKPA. When it is found that the initial state's jurisdiction
does not continue, of course, the forum state may modify the order. The strong
interest of the forum state could undermine the PKPA's national standards for de-
termining jurisdiction at this stage.
If the jurisdiction of the initial court is found to continue, then the PKPA
years. However, the New Mexico Supreme court has rejected Bodenheimer's interpretation. Serna v. Salazar, 98 N.M.
648, 651 P.2d 1292 (1982). In holding that a full evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine "significant connection"
continuing jurisdiction, the Montana Supreme Court also rejected it. Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899, 905 (Mont. 1982).
In a questionable decision, a New York court has held that the initial court continued to have exclusive continuing
jurisdiction, because it expressly reserved jurisdiction and the PKPA forbids the exercise of jurisdiction during the
"pendeney of a proceeding in a court in another State." Diane W. v. Norman W., 112 Misc. 2d 114, 116. 446 N.Y.S.2d
174, 176 (1982) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (1982)). Surely Congress did not intend that an initial court can so easily
and permanently continue its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts without regard to atrophy of ties to the initial
jurisdiction.
64. Cf. Virginia E. E. v. Alberto S. P., 110 Misc. 2d 448, 456, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979. 984 (1981) (Illinois decree).
65. Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d 86, 89, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911. 915 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
66. Id. at 92, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
67. The Leslie holding, Id., was weakened by the fact that the court also indicated that the California court may have
declined jurisdiction, id. at 89, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 915. Another New York decision, however, evidenced the same
propensity when it held that the initial decree state of Illinois no longer had continuing jurisdiction without discussing the
state's law at all, but rather by noting that New York had been the home state for four years. Virginia E.E. v. Alberto
S.P., 110 Misc. 2d 448, 456, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (1981).
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mandates that its decree must be enforced according to its terms unless modification
is permitted by subsection (f) of the PKPA. Therefore, the last step is to apply
subsection (f).
Step 4: Determine whether the second state court has the power to modify under
the provisions of subsection (f). First, it must have jurisdiction, which will have been
determined at Step 1. Second, the court of the first state must no longer have
jurisdiction, or it must have declined jurisdiction to modify. If the first state's con-
tinling jurisdiction already has been determined at Step 3, the only inquiry remaining
is whether it has declined to exercise its jurisdiction to modify the decree. If it has not
so declined, then the second court does not have authority to modify and must enforce
the initial order according to its terms.
III. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
Although the PKPA sets standards for determining jurisdiction and also provides
a federal parental locator service through which federal records may be used to locate
absconding parents, nothing in it68 or any other federal legislation 69 creates sub-
stantive rights to child custody. Since federal court jurisdiction was neither specif-
ically foreclosed nor created by the PKPA, the only feasible basis for federal jurisdic-
tion over a child abduction incident is diversity jurisdiction. 70
68. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982), stating: "We note that conspicuously absent from
this comprehensive enactment is any provision creating or recognizing a direct role for the federal courts in determining
child custody. Indeed. the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress deliberately and emphatically omitted
such a role.". The court's words "determining child custody" and the quotations from congressional testimony, which the
court sets out in footnote 6 of its opinion, all concern substantive decisions on the merits. Id. at 1043 n.6.
69. In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982), the Supreme Court settled
speculation concerning the availability of federal habeas corpus to resolve child custody disputes by holding that, even
when state action which terminated parental rights was challenged as unconstitutional, the habeas corpus statute did not
affect federal jurisdiction. The Court held that the petitioner actually sought to relitigate "not any liberty interest of her
sons. but the interest in her own parental rights" and that federal habeas corpus had never been available to challenge
parental rights or child custody. Id. at 511. The Court buttressed its holding with policy considerations of federalism and
the "exceptional need for finality in child-custody disputes." Id. at 512. The Court recognized that stability and certainty
of care was essential for children and that extended uncertainty would be inevitable if federal courts had jurisdiction to
'relitigate state custody decisions." Id. at 514. Thus, the Court ruled on the same policy of protecting children from
disruption that has prompted passage of both the UCCJA and the PKPA.
70. Hoff and Schulman reviewed the legislative history and language of the PKPA, noting that federal court
jurisdiction was not foreclosed by the statute, and concluded that Congress did not intend to change the status quo with
respect to federal court jurisdiction in custody cases. P. HOFF & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 8-35 to -36.
Coombs explains that review of the federal duty created by the PKPA would be available through petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court to review state court decisions. He notes that whether other avenues into federal court were
available was beyond the scope of his article. Coombs, Enforcement, supra note 34, at 784 n.41 1.
In general, for federal question jurisdiction to exist, federal law must be a direct element in plaintiff's cause of action,
not a remote or indirect factor in allowing the action to be brought. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank. 299 U.S. 109, 115-16
(1936); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562 (1975 & Supp. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Therefore, when a federal right has been created by Congress without express or
implied remedy, ordinarily only state court action and remedies are available. Id. § 3562, at 411-12 (1975); cf. Huber
Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 951 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958). The full faith and
credit clause (and presumably statutes enacted to implement it) prescribes a rule by which to determine what faith and
credit to give judgments and public acts, and it does not create a basis for federal court jurisdiction. Minnesota v. Northern
Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904); Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 n. I (5th Cir.
1974) (action on a state court default judgment in which the court stated, "[W]e have the rather anomalous situation of a
federal diversity court deciding a controversy in which Congress has . . . federalized all relevant legal questions-a
diversity case in which there are not issues of forum state law."); New York v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 464 F. Supp. 196, 198
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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A. Advantages of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
Among the many reasons why the parent entitled to custody may wish to bring
an enforcement action in federal court, two reasons stand out. First, if enforcement
procedures are to be brought where the child has been taken, the federal forum avoids
the notorious local prejudice of the state court where the child is located.7 Second, a
personal order in the nature of an injunction to produce the child, if granted by the
federal court for the state of the custodian, can reach the abducting parent anywhere
in the country.72 This is the only method to allow the custodial parent, who is often
financially and psychologically disadvantaged in the foreign jurisdiction, to pursue
enforcement with local counsel in a proceeding close to home.
73
From the perspective of enforcing federal policy, federal court interpretation of
the PKPA would insure the application of a uniform federal standard for determining
jurisdiction and requiring enforcement of sister state decrees, which was desired
when Congress enacted the PKPA.74 Although a federal court in a diversity action
sits as another state court75 in applying that state's law, 76 it is not bound by state
interpretations of federal law7 7 and, presumably, not prejudiced by strong local
concerns.78 Furtherance of federal policy could be helped most by federal courts
determining more fairly than state courts whether the initial state's jurisdiction con-
tinues.
The traditional requisites for diversity jurisdiction in an interstate child abduc-
tion can exist without regard to the PKPA. Therefore, the PKPA itself appropriately
did not provide for federal jurisdiction. The required diversity of citizenship is often
present in interstate child abduction incidents because the abducting parent es-
tablishes residence in a state different from that of the custodian. A tort damages
claim, as discussed below, can supply the required amount in controversy. It will be
argued below that the PKPA eliminates the rationale for an exception to diversity
jurisdiction.
71. Even among those who wish to narrow the range of diversity jurisdiction, there is support for maintaining
diversity actions to protect the "out of state" party from local prejudice. Phillips, Nizer. Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v.
Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1973); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTION
BETVEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DIGESr 2 (1969); WRIGTrr & MILLER, supra note 70. § 3601.
72. The mandate of a federal court injunction runs throughout the United States so that disobedience anywhere is
contempt of the granting court without the necessity of having registered the injunction order at the place of violation.
Leman v. Krenlter-Amold Co., 284 U.S. 448, 454 (1932); Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1963).
73. Although the PKPA provides that the Federal Fugitive Felon Act is applicable to felonious parental kidnappings,
that Act does not give the deprived parent a private right to require the Justice Department to issue a warrant for the
fugitive parent or to produce the child. Beach v. Smith, 535 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
74. Pub. Law No. 96-611, § 7(b), 94 Stat. 3568 (1980); Note, The Uniforn Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Dual Response to Interstate Child Custody Problems, 39 WASHt. & LEE L. REV.
149, 159 (1982); Note, The Parental Kidnapping Preventing Act of 1980-An End to Child Snatching, 8 J. LEGts. 357,
366 (1981).
75. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
76. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (law); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938)
(equity).
77. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied. 424 U.S. 917 (1975); Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 914 (1967); Owen v.
Illinois Baking Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
78. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 70, § 3601.
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B. The Domestic Relations Exception
1. Theory and Application
The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction developed from dicta
in a series of Supreme Court cases. In the seminal case of Barber v. Barber in 1859
the Court stated: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce."7 9 It held, however, that the federal courts had the
power to decide whether a divorce was valid and ruled that a district court had
diversity jurisdiction to enforce a state court decree granting a separation and ali-
mony. The Supreme Court noted that the courts of equity in England will interfere to
compel payment of alimony ordered by the ecclesiastical courts and that the reason
for the exercise of the equity power there was equally applicable in the United States.
The stated reason was that when a court of competent jurisdiction decrees divorce and
alimony, a court of equity will interfere to prevent the decree from being defeated by
fraud." °
in re Burris,8 1 decided in 1890, was a habeas corpus action to obtain custody of
a child. The Supreme Court held that the federal habeas corpus statute was inapplic-
able by its terms and, in dicta, repeated even more extensively its earlier disclaimer of
federal jurisdiction: "The whole subject of domestic relations ... belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." 82
It appears that even today the United States Supreme Court has never applied its
dicta to preclude exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction. 83 The dicta in these and
other Supreme Court cases 84 have been applied, however, by numerous lower courts
to deny jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. 85 Among them are cases that
would require determinations on the merits of child custody issues. 86
Early cases suggested a total lack of power to decide domestic relations issues87
in the federal courts, which led to academic speculation over the justification for this
domestic relations exception. 88 More recently, the decisions hold that policies of
federal-state comity warrant deference to the state's strong interest in domestic rela-
tions and to the greater competence of the state courts in domestic relations matters. 89
79. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859).
80. Id. at 590-91.
81. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
82. Id. at 593-94.
83. The one case in the Supreme Court that has found a lack of jurisdiction in a domestic relations matter was not a
diversity case. Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
84. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
85. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v.
Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1973); Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782
(1947); Bercovitch v. Tanbum, 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa
1951); Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
86. See Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1981); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980); Huynh
Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021-26 (3d Cir. 1975); Buechold
v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Hemstadt v. Hemstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967).
87. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
88. Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversip. Jurisdiction of Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1956).
89. WRiGirr & MILLER, supra note 70, § 3609. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978);
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2nd Cir. 1973); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371
(9th Cir. 1968); Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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Avoidance of conflicting federal and state court decrees also is stated as a theoretical
underpinning for the refusal to entertain domestic relations cases.9 0 After Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins, 9 1 of course, the federal court would be applying state family law.
These reasons suggest a fear that the policies of Erie will fail because of the inability
or unwillingness of federal judges to master the family law developed in the states. 92
In general, the determination of what a domestic relationship should be, sometimes
described as determining status, 93 is still considered beyond the competence of the
federal courts. Included are questions whether a divorce should be granted, 94 alimony
or support should be ordered, 95 one person or another should have custody of or
rights to visit a child,96 an adoption should be decreed,9 7 or a child should remain in
the United States. 98
2. Domestic Relations Exception Inapplicable
The narrow character of the exception is readily apparent when one contrasts
groups of cases in which the federal courts have exercised diversity jurisdiction in
spite of a close connection to domestic relations. 99 Federal courts ordinarily have
jurisdiction to declare the validity and effect of instruments and decrees. For ex-
ample, the United States Supreme Court in 1888 stated that federal courts prima facie
had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for cancellation of an allegedly forged instrument,
even though it was a purported written declaration of marriage. 0 Actions to declare
an alleged divorce invalid' 0 ' and to obtain property or damages because of the effect
of the invalid divorce'0 2 have been held within diversity jurisdiction. In these actions,
the petitioner sometimes sought a determination of the effect of an instrument or court
decree in order to pursue a separate cause of action in contract or tort to obtain
property or money. These actions have sometimes been described as actions to
determine the property rights, 0 3 and not the status, of the parties.
90. Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (ist Cir. 1981); HuynhThi Anh v. Levi. 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978).
Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978). Crouch mentioned congestion of federal courts as a possible reason
for the exception, but refused to deny jurisdiction on that basis. Id. at 486-87.
91. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. The reasons given are consistent with the Erie policies of insuring that the outcome in a federal suit does not
differ from that in the state court, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99. 109 (1945), discouraging forum shopping,
and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
93. Vestal & Foster, supra note 88, at 31.
94. Ostrom v. Ostrom, 231 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955); Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849 (7th Cir. 1887): In re
Wilson, 314 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
95. Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
96. Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2nd Cir. 1967).
97. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978).
98. Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980).
99. There does appear to be an alarming degree of inconsistency in application of the exception. For example, a
court that described the exception as narrow upheld jurisdiction to determine legal fees in connection with a domestic
matter, but criticized availability of diversity jurisdiction and suggested that had a request been timely made the issue
would have been left to state resolution. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel. 490 F.2d 509. 514-16
(2nd Cir. 1973). Inconsistencies are a major reason for recommendation that the exception be abrogated entirely. Note.
The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: A Re-Evalation,. 24 B.C.L. REv. 661, 673-74 (1983).
100. Terry v. Sharon, 131 U.S. 40 (1889).
101. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 348 U.S. 896 (1954); Spindel v. Spindel. 283 F.
Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); McNeil v. McNeil, 78 F. 834 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
102. Cohen v. Randall, 137 F.2d 441 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 796 (1943).
103. Note, supra note 99, at 673-74.
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A related group of cases decided since 1980 that has been held to fall within
diversity jurisdiction involves tort causes of action for money damages arising from
marital disputes, including abduction of a child. ' 0 4 In Cole v. Cole10 5 and Wasserman
v. Wasserman 10 6 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a tort cause of
action was not dependent on family relationships and was within the competence of
federal courts. Most important, both decisions recognized that the power to determine
the validity and effect of prior orders and to allow money damages for their violation
need not include substantive determinations of family relations. 10 7 In Wasserman, a
tort action for abduction of a child in violation of an existing custody order, the court
emphasized that it was not being asked to make a "determination of entitlement to
custody' l0 8 because "[tihe only genuine custody issue-whether appellant was enti-
tled to custody for all times relevant to the complaint-was definitively determined
by [the state court order].' 10 9
In Bennett v. Bennett, 10 the court cited Wasserman favorably and held that the
tort cause of action should be heard in the diversity action. In an extremely brief
discussion the court pointed out that the domestic relations exception was carved out
long ago and that under it a federal court will not take jurisdiction if that would
require it to "grant a divorce, determine alimony or support obligations, or resolve
parental conflicts over the custody of their children.""' It then stated that a federal
court will hear suits such as tort or contract "which do not exceed . . . its com-
petence."1 2 The court stated that a federal court is entirely competent to determine
traditional tort issues, and, recognizing that the case would depend upon the validity
and effect of the various state custody decrees in existence at the time of the alleged
tort, it held that "the task of determining such validity and effect is also not beyond
the competence of the federal courts." ' 13 These recent decisions entertaining the
cause of action for tort damages for child abduction are consistent with the previous
cases in which a determination of the effect of a decree involving domestic relations
was held to be within federal diversity jurisdiction." 4
In one group of cases, an action to enforce a previously granted state decree
affecting a domestic relations matter also has been accepted as within the competence
104. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d
1107 (5th Cir. 1980); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). For analyses of tort causes of action against
the noncustodial parent and those who conspire with her or him, see Note, supra note 4; Note, The Tort of Custodial
Interference-Toward a More Complete Remedy to Parental Kidnappings. 1983 ILL. L. REv. 229; Note, Tortious
Interference with Custody: An Action to Supplement Iowa Statutory Deterrents to Child Snatching. 68 IowA L. REv. 495
(1983). For a list of cases see Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Iowa 1983).
105. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
106. 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
107. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980); Wasserman v. Wasserman. 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982). See Note, supra note 99. at 667-80.
108. 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.). cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
109. Id.
110. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Ill. Id. at 1042.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978); Richie v. Richie. 186 F. Supp. 592, 594 (E.D.N.Y. 1960)
(separation agreement).
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and jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases. In these cases the plaintiff had not
pursued a separate cause of action in which validity of the domestic relations decree
was an ancillary issue, but rather, had asserted a cause of action to enforce a contract
or the decree itself." 5 The decisive factor in avoiding the domestic relations excep-
tion has been the lack of any opportunity to determine substantive domestic relations
matters. 116 Enforcement of nonmodifiable monetary obligations has not been un-
usual. 117 Federal courts occasionally have enforced modifiable alimony obligations
as well. The earliest significant case of this kind was Harrison v. Harrison,18 in
which the plaintiff sued in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to
enforce an Ohio alimony decree. The court not only entered a judgment enforceable
by federal procedures for the past due alimony, but also entered an order to pay future
alimony. The court quoted favorably the trial court's declaration that it would not
entertain an application for modification, thereby leaving such changes to the Ohio
court which, if made, would be adopted by the federal court. The Court of Appeals
justified enforcement by noting that otherwise the plaintiff would be compelled to sue
at law on each installment, which might afford the obligor an opportunity to evade
enforcement. For authority that such power existed, the court quoted both the Su-
preme Court's holding in the 1858 Barber decision that equity power existed to
enforce alimony orders," 9 and modem statements that the intent of Erie v. Tompkins
was to insure that the outcome of litigation in a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction should be substantially the same as if tried in a state court. 120
In 1976 in Keating v. Keating12 1 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded a district court's refusal to enforce a state alimony decree for future
payments, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the full breadth of relief afforded
by the state decree so long as it was not modified.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY DECREES
A. Traditionally Within the Exception
Although federal courts have enforced monetary decrees for alimony, occa-
sionally even when subject to modification, no federal court had enforced child
custody orders' 2 2 prior to Bennett. It is submitted that the reason no federal court had
enforced child custody orders before Bennett lies in the nearly universal practice
115. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859) (alimony); Gonzales v. Gonzales, 74 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (alimony).
116. For an analysis classifying the cases as "propertylstatus," "nature of the case," or "determinelenforce," see
Note, supra note 99, at 673-74. However, whether they are classified as "property" or "tort" cases is hardly significant.
The common denominator among all in which jurisdiction was found is the absence of any need to make a substantive
determination of a family relations issue.
117. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
118. 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954).
119. Id. at 573.
120. Id. at 574.
121. 542 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976). Cf. Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978) (judgment for present value
of future payments promised in separation agreement).
122. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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within states of entertaining motions to modify in proceedings brought to enforce a
previous child custody order.'
23
As described earlier,'2 4 because the United States Supreme Court had held that
modifiable custody orders were not entitled to more credit than would be due in the
state where decreed, the second state court, if asked to enforce a prior state court's
custody order, routinely entertained the modification request. This was the incentive
for interstate child abduction that has been so thoroughly publicized and criticized.
What has not been as widely noted is that this same practice accounted for the
application of the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction when a
petitioner sought federal enforcement of a custody decree.
In 1967 in the leading case of Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 125 an action for a de-
claratory judgment construing a parent's visitation rights, the Second Circuit stated
that the domestic relations exception precluded federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate
custody and that because custody decrees were not entitled to full faith and credit, 1
26
the obligations of that clause would not affect the exception. Without discussion, the
court assumed that any attempt to construe or enforce the earlier decree would require
a re-examination of the merits. 127 That assumption must have been based on knowl-
edge of the common practice. A federal court, which seeks to act as another state
court and to afford the same relief obtainable in state court, would follow the state
practice of entertaining the modification request in the enforcement proceeding. That,
of course, would require a determination on the merits of who should have custody of
the child. That was clearly a determination long excluded by the domestic relations
exception.
A more recent case dramatically displays the posture taken by the federal courts
prior to 1981 when asked to enforce one of two conflicting state custody judgments.
In Sutter v. Pitts'28 an Alabama court had given the father custody rights, after which
a Massachusetts court awarded the mother custody. The father took the child from
Massachusetts. The mother instituted an action in the federal district court for Massa-
chusetts seeking an injunction restraining the father from refusing to deliver the child
to her. Although the mother alleged violations of her constitutional rights, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that she was actually seeking
enforcement of the state court custody decree. The court held that the domestic
relations exception applied because a de novo determination on the merits would be
necessary to resolve the mother's request, and a likelihood of conflicting state and
federal decrees would result. 129 As in Hernstadt, the court assumed that a determina-
tion on the merits would be necessary. Since Massachusetts had not enacted the
123. In custody proceedings, both enforcement of an order and its modification are prospective in nature. In
contrast, alimony obligations, being monetary, are enforced by execution or garnishment. The practice is to entertain
future alimony modification requests by motion only in the original action. This could explain why a federal court would
be willing to enforce modifiable alimony orders, but not modifiable custody orders.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
125. 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967).
126. Id. at 318.
127. Id.
128. 639 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 844.
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UCCJA and the PKPA had not been passed at the time of argument before the federal
court, traditional state law and practice would convert what appeared to be an
enforcement action into a modification proceeding.
The similarity of Sutter to the holding in Bennett v. Bennett130 is striking. The
Bennett court held that the request for an injunction to enforce the custody decree
would not be entertained because it would depend not merely on past rights and
wrongs, but "would also require an inquiry into the present interests of the minor
children,"' 3' which would "seriously compromise the principles underlying the
domestic relations exception."' 132 The court apparently meant the principle that fed-
eral courts were not competent to decide the merits of custody disputes. The plaintiff
had stated in his brief that only a federal court's process would be effective in the
matter because the Ohio court would not enforce the District of Columbia decree.
Although the court sympathized with his concern, it stated that there were better ways
to resolve the dilemma "than by giving the federal courts the power to determine the
custody of children."' 33 The court then briefly discussed the PKPA, noting, "[C]on-
spicuously absent from this comprehensive enactment is any provision creating or
recognizing a direct role for the federal courts in determining child custody."'
134
The holdings and rationales of Sutter and Bennett are similar, but Sutter is right
and Bennett is wrong. The reason is the effect of the PKPA, enacted on December 28,
1980, after Sutter but before Bennett.
135
B. PKPA: Eliminating the Basis for the Domestic Relations Exception
The Bennett court correctly used legislative history and the stated purposes of
the newly enacted PKPA to support its conclusion that the intent of Congress was that
determinations on the merits of child custody issues should be left to the states.
However, the court analyzed neither the mechanism by which the statute carried out
that purpose nor the further purpose to limit those determinations as much as possible
to the court initially making a custody order. Consequently, it failed to detect the
crucial difference between enforcement and modification, and that enforcement need
not involve a determination of child custody.' 36 Judge Edwards understood and
130. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
131. Id. at 1042. At this point the court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 942 (1979) concerning
injunctions against tort. This suggests a failure to realize that it was being asked to enforce ajudgment, not enjoin a tort.
132. 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Sutter was argued on appeal December 2, 1980, and decided February II, 1981. The Bennett opinion states
that the district court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on October 29, 1980. Id. at 1041. But the ease was not
argued before the court of appeals until April 26, 1982. It was decided July 23, 1982. The federal rule is that a statute
enacted while a case is on direct review should be applied unless it would result in manifest injustice. Bradley v.
Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1973). Because private parties were involved and argument had already been
held in Sutter, it probably would have been unfair to apply the PKPA. but in Bennett argument was 16 months after
enactment. See id. at 716 (discussion of possible exception for private parties). The exception has been held inapplicable
in a child custody case. Tufares v. Wright, 98 N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522 (1982).
136. Unfortunately, two student notes have approved the majority opinion in Bennett because they also failed to
recognize that the PKPA now requires differentiation between enforcement and modification. See Note, Federal
Jurisdiction-The Domestic Relations Exception and the Tort of fiterstate Child-Snatching. 16 CREIGIrrON L. REv. 815.
827 (1983); Note, supra note 99, at 684 (critizing Bennett result and advocating elimination of the domestic relations
exception).
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utilized the distinction between enforcement and modification in his dissent. The
PKPA supplies the missing legal imperative for his position. In one brief enactment
Congress has nationally mandated enforcement by state authorities, not modification,
of child custody determinations, thus filling the full faith and credit void and de-
molishing the practice of routinely entertaining modification requests in interstate
child custody enforcement actions. The PKPA forbids the traditional state practice of
converting an interstate enforcement action into a modification proceeding. The
PKPA eliminates Bodenheimer's third myth. 137 The Bennett majority described the
situation before it as "profoundly sad.' 138 The situation was more profoundly sad
than it realized, for the court's holding was based on no more than a destroyed myth.
Although the PKPA by its terms does not apply to federal courts, it obliterates
the rationale that had supported the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdic-
tion in actions to enforce child custody orders. The rationale for the exception had
been that the federal court would be forced to determine the merits of a custody
relationship whenever requested to enforce a child custody order. The PKPA, if
applicable in the diversity action, also would mandate enforcement without regard to
the merits in the diversity proceeding. Assuming the PKPA is within the con-
stitutional lawmaking authority of Congress, 139 it would be applicable in a diversity
action on one of two bases in the federal Rules of Decision Act,' 40 which requires
that the laws of the state apply in diversity actions "except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide."'' 4 1
One basis for application of the PKPA is the state law clause and the Erie doctrine.
The theory would be that the law of judgments applicable in the state where the
federal court sits is the law to be applied by the diversity court. 142 This is the rationale
most often presented by federal courts holding that a federal diversity court must
accord the same full faith and credit to another state's judgment as would be accorded
to it by the courts of the state where it sits.
14 3
The other basis would be the federal law exception in the Act. When a right
based on a federal statute is asserted in a diversity action, the federal statute is
controlling and the state law provision is not applicable. "44 It has been forcefully
argued that the federal statute implementing the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution is the true basis for the rule that federal courts in diversity suits must give
full faith and credit to judgments of other state courts. ' 45 That statute 46 specifies that
judicial proceedings of any state "shall have the full faith and credit in every court
137. See supra text accompanying note 36.
138. 682 F.2d 1039, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
139. The claimed sources of power are the full faith and credit clause and commerce clause. P. HoFF & J. SCHuL-
MAN. supra note 7, at 1-6.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
141. Id.
142. Hardy v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 232 F.2d 205. 208 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956).
143. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 753 (1976).
144. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1877); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v.
Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1326 (2d Cir. 1977); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 205 F.2d 589, 594
(5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 930 (1954); Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F. Supp. 426, 432-33 (N.D. Miss.
1974).
145, Degnan, supra note 143, at 750-55.
19841
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
within the United States," thus addressing both state and federal courts. A federal
diversity court is required, therefore, by this federal statute to give full faith and
credit, and the Erie rationale is superfluous. Such straightforward reasoning is not
possible under the PKPA because its words are directed only to the "authorities of
every State."' 47 The federal law rationale would be correct, however, in the sense
that the federal statute mandates rights to enforcement that state law cannot ignore or
abrogate. 148 Consequently, there is no state law upon which Erie could operate.
Since either the federal law or the Erie interpretation of the PKPA under the Rules of
Decision Act would require that federal courts apply the PKPA, drawing the distinc-
tion may be purely academic. Some opinions requiring federal courts to recognize
other state court judgments have referred to both bases in support of their decision. 149
What is clear is that the PKPA would apply in a diversity suit for enforcement of
a child custody order and would require the differentiation between enforcement and
modification for which Judge Edwards argued. Since the primary mandate of the
PKPA is to require enforcement without regard to the merits in the second court and
modification in the initial court, the rationale for the domestic relations exception to
diversity jurisdiction will no longer exist in most cases. In those cases in which the
PKPA entitles plaintiff to an order of enforcement in state court, the federal court
should fashion whatever comparable federal relief is necessary to enforcement.
150
The remedy need not be labeled in the same way as the appropriate state remedy.' 51
The most likely order would be in the nature of an injunction to deliver the child or to
refrain from violating the custody order. It would be a tragic irony if it were federal
courts that refused to recognize this federally created right to enforcement.
C. Applying the PKPA in Diversity Actions for Enforcement of Child Custody Orders
The PKPA requires the court of a second state, when presented with a request to
enforce or modify a prior state's decree concerning the child's custody, to determine
whether the prior decree is entitled to enforcement under the PKPA. 152 If it is,
enforcement without regard to the merits must be granted. The federal court in a
diversity action is subject to the PKPA just as a state court to which its terms were
addressed. For that reason alone, the federal court in the diversity action should
entertain the enforcement request before deciding that the domestic relations excep-
tion applies. Only if enforcement is not required would dismissal or a continuance
until the appropriate state court has modified be in order.
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
147. Id. § 1738A.
148. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (stating that the Erie doctrine "is inapplicable
to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that
legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than
from local law").
149. Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 841 n.4 (3d Cir. 1972); Porter v. Wilson, 419 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1020 (1970).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982) provides that federal courts may issue all "necessary" and "appropriate" writs. The
fact that the purpose of the order would be to enforce and not modify a valid decree renders irrelevant the Bennett
majority's distinctions between retrospective and prospective relief. See 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
151. Stem v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(t) (1982).
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The Bennett situation is complicated by the fact that the decree sought to be
enforced is that of the jurisdiction within which the federal court was sitting. The
PKPA requires "[t]he appropriate authorities of every State" to enforce any child
custody determination made "by a court of another State."'' 53 If the enforcement
proceeding were brought as an independent injunction action in a District of Colum-
bia court, assuming that the District is a state for purposes of the Act,' 5 4 the PKPA
would not be applicable because a decree of another state is not involved. 155 Enforce-
ment in Bennett was not of a custody determination of another state, but rather, for a
decree of the same jurisdiction in which the federal court was sitting. Technically, the
PKPA could be ignored. The majority decision in Bennett would be supportable
because the decree was modifiable within the District, enforcement proceedings in
the District would include a modification request, and the domestic relations excep-
tion could apply. This would be technically accurate, but "profoundly sad."
The newly enacted national policy of the PKPA, to discourage interstate child
abductions through enforcement of decrees, would be furthered by granting the
injunction. The national policy of distinguishing enforcement from modification and
favoring the former would be furthered by entertaining the action unless modification
were requested. If it were, then dismissal or continuance of the action until the district
court had ruled on the modification request would be appropriate. There is no indica-
tion in the Bennett opinion that the mother would request modification. The petitioner
father was seeking an effective way to enforce the custody order against an interstate
child abductor who had violated the order. The policy of differentiating between
enforcement and modification undermines the rationale for the domestic relations
exception as surely as would the technical application of the statute. Since enforce-
ment does not require a consideration of modification, there is no more reason to
153. Id. § 1738A(a).
154. Id. Section 1738A(b)(8) defines the term "State" to include the District of Columbia. Cf. Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Hsu, 478 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Md. 1979).
155. An entirely different way to analyze Bennett requires full application of the PKPA to the District of Columbia
decree. This may be best understood by considering other PKPA litigation in which state courts have been asked to enter a
new order after the enactment of the PKPA. These courts have applied the PKPA "provisions" to orders made prior to the
PKPA's passage to determine whether they now have jurisdiction to modify. See, e.g.. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d
122 (Ala. App. 1982); Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. App. 1982); Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 110
Misc. 2d 86, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Fam. Ct. 1981); Virginia E. E. v. Alberto S. P., 110 Misc. 2d 448, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979
(1981); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295 (Vyo. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1436 (1983). The PKPA provides that
the authorities of every state shall enforce "any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this
section by a court of another State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982). If a decree entered prior to the PKPA was made
consistently with its provisions, after the passage of the PKPA it would be entitled to enforcement and modification would
be precluded. Conversely, if a decree entered prior to the PKPA, although valid and enforceable under state law, was not
in accord with the PKPA provisions, then by the terms of the PKPA it would not be entitled to enforcement and could be
modified. Cf. Coombs, Enforcement, supra note 34, at 8-2. In Bennett the 1979 District of Columbia decree was a
modification of the initial order entered in Ohio, which had awarded custody to the mother. Ohio was the home state of the
children at the time of the Ohio order. Since the children had been in the district only one year prior to the 1979 order,
Ohio may have had continuing jurisdiction under its version of the UCCJA. Olto REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.21 to .37
(Page 1980). If so, under the PKPA, the district court would have been forbidden to enter a new order and the order it
entered would not have been consistent with any of the PKPA "provisions." Therefore, although the order would be valid
because the District of Columbia had not enacted the UCCJA, it would not be entitled to enforcement under the PKPA.
The limiting words of the PKPA require a different result than under the full faith and credit statute, under which the
Supreme Court has held that the third forum court must enforce ajudgment of the second forum that failed to give full faith
and credit to a first forum judgment. Trienies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939). Retroactivity and
collateral attack are beyond the scope of this Article.
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except that form of enforcement from diversity jurisdiction than there is to except the
tort cause of action.' 
56
Once it is recognized that none of the reasons for the exception are applicable,
Judge Edward's criticism is even more credible. He noted that to refuse the injunction
but to allow tort damages permitted the abducting parent to purchase the illegal
custody of the child. '57 The incentive to abduct a child and go to a second jurisdiction
lies partially in the knowledge that it will be difficult for the rightful custodian to
proceed with an enforcement action, either in federal or state court at the distant
location to which the child is taken. If there is no possibility of the federal court of the
first jurisdiction granting an injunction that can reach the abductor, the disgruntled
parent is encouraged to try to reach the relative safety of the second state. An
abductor who is either judgment proof or willing to pay may succeed in retaining the
child. The reasoning of the Harrison'58 court in enforcing future alimony orders to
prevent their evasion is now applicable to child custody orders.
A second reason why the Bennett court should have entertained the enforcement
action is the illogical and adverse result of different domestic relations exceptions
depending upon whether the federal court is sitting where the decree was rendered or
at the location of the second state to which the child has been taken. The result the
Seventh Circuit reached in Lloyd v. Loeffler'59 is evidence of the danger. In Lloyd the
custody decree had been granted in Maryland and the mother, apparently in violation
of the decree, took the child to Wisconsin, where her parents cooperated to conceal
the child's whereabouts. The suit was filed in the federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. Wisconsin had enacted the UCCJA in a form that may
have required the courts of Wisconsin to enforce and not modify the Maryland
decree,' 60 and the PKPA had been enacted well before the argument and decision on
appeal. 161 Consequently, the enforcement principles of the UCCJA and the PKPA
should have been even more applicable in Lloyd than in Bennett. However, neither
were discussed. The trial court recognized a tort cause of action against the grand-
parents for conspiracy to interfere with Lloyd's custody of the child. This was
affirmed on appeal.' 62 The trial court also entered a damage award of $2,000.00
every month until the child was returned to her father's lawful custody. The court of
appeals, in a lengthy dictum, characterized this as the equivalent of an injunction
order. 16 3 It said that the district court should have considered whether it had the
156. Economy of litigation calls for combining the two causes of action rather than encouraging separate suits for
different remedies in the state and federal courts as Bennett does. See Note, supra note 99, at 673-74.
157. 682 F.2d 1039, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
158. 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954). See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
159. 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
160. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 822.14 (West Supp. 1983).
161. Lloyd was argued Oct. 5, 1982 and decided Nov. 30, 1982.
162. 694 F.2d 489, 497 (7th Cir. 1982).
163. Id. at 494.
164. Id. The court mentioned the PKPA only to say that it did not preclude federal remedies. Id. at 493.
163. Id. at 494. Interestingly, the court expressed concern for the welfare of the child in wrenching her from the
abductors who had had her in custody for three years, and concern for the -costly option" of her abductors to go back to
Maryland for a modification while the monthly damage award continued. This has an Alice in Wonderland quality to it.
Both the state UCCJA and the federal PKPA evidence legislative policy decisions that the welfare of the child should be
determined in Maryland so long as that state's courts continued to have jurisdiction. The welfare of a particular child may
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power to enjoin the grandparents directly, and that "[a]n affirmative answer would
produce a collision" with Bennett.' 64 The court assumed, as had the majority in
Bennett, that an injunction action necessarily would involve consideration of the
merits of the dispute. It commented that deciding to put pressure on the grandparents
necessarily would answer the question of who should have custody of the child at the
time of attempted enforcement.'
65
What is most dangerous in the Lloyd language is its assumption that any enforce-
ment proceedings will reach the merits, and its apparent ignorance of the necessity to
determine whether there would be jurisdiction to consider the merits in the state
court. The UCCJA, the law of Wisconsin, and the PKPA (which is federal law
controlling in every state), require that that inquiry be made first. In contrast to the
Bennett situation, the decree sought to be enforced in Lloyd was that of a court of
another state. Thus, both the UCCJA and the PKPA would mandate that the Wiscon-
sin authorities enforce, not modify, the decree, unless Maryland no longer had
jurisdiction. The enforcement/modification dichotomy, which now obtains every-
where, applies with particular force when the diversity proceeding for enforcement is
brought in a federal court of a state other than the one where an initial decree was
entered. Then the Rules of Decision Act would require application of the PKPA.
Thus, the principles supporting the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdic-
tion would no more apply than in the tort cause of action. The reasoning of Bennett
was not only wrong, but is singularly inapt in the Lloyd situation.
V. CONCLUSION
The erroneous rationales of Bennett and Lloyd carry a special danger for un-
dermining the purposes and goals of the PKPA, because the two together prevent the
rightful custodian of an abducted child from obtaining enforcement in the federal
court of either his own or the abductor's state. The custodian is forced into the courts
of the abductor's state, which have shown an alarming tendency to continue their
parochial protection of their own residents even under the PKPA. Since the terms of
the PKPA were not analyzed in either opinion, the decisions should have little
precedential value. When federal courts in the future are presented squarely with the
question of the PKPA's effect on enforcement of child custody determinations in
federal court, the errors of Bennett and Lloyd should be avoided. 166
be sacrificed, but the legislative decision is that continuing jurisdiction in the initial court will decrease the overall horrors
of child abduction. It is ironic that the federal court, in the name of a court-created exception to diversity jurisdiction
designed to protect it from having to consider the merits of the welfare of the child, considered the merits and made a
decision contrary to the legislative mandate that it not consider them. If the court had applied the UCCJA or the PKPA, it
might have decided that Maryland no longer had jurisdiction, and, therefore, that the courts of Wisconsin did have power
to modify and the domestic relations exception applied. But its erroneous application of the law precluded it from making
the key determination under the PKPA that could have resulted in enforcement, i.e.. that Maryland's jurisdiction
continued. In that situation, Congress has decided that the expense of going back to Maryland for modification is
warranted.
166. Flood v. Brmaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984) (reported after this manuscript was submitted for publication)
was the first such decision. The court held that federal intervention to stay a state modification proceeding was permis-
sible. The court clearly differentiated between enforcement and modification, noting that "[blecause § 1738A permits
only one state at a time to assert jurisdiction, a federal court could enforce a decree without becoming enmeshed in the
underlying custody dispute." Id. at 310. The court explained that Congress could not have intended to render § 1738A
virtually nugatory by precluding a federal forum from insuring compliance. Id. at 312.
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The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act indirectly requires federal courts in
diversity actions to entertain a request to enforce the prior custody determination of
another state. The PKPA has removed the domestic relations exception rationale for
not doing so. Additionally, the federal courts should be available to enforce child
custody determinations of the state where the federal court sits when the de-
terminations are not modifiable in that state, or when no request for modification has
been made. Federal enforcement would make effective the policy of the PKPA by
finally insuring uniform national standards for jurisdiction to enforce and to modify
child custody determinations, which could significantly reduce child abduction.
